Publications

In this paper, game theory is used to model Chevron and Rosneft’s behavior in the context of the sanctions on the Government of Venezuela. We reached a Nash equilibrium where each player has incentives to cooperate with each other and continue operations in the country by increasing crude oil production.

The road to democracy in Venezuela in the last 100 years cannot be understood without understanding oil and the economic structure it generates. The “exceptionality” of the Venezuelan political phenomenon in the twentieth century is the “exceptionality” of the immense mineral resources and the type of economic institutions that organize such activity. Analyzing the economic structure allows shedding light on the “convoluted” transit from nineteenth-century authoritarianism, characterized by caudillismo2, to democracy (1936-1958); as well as the democratic reversal and resurgence of authoritarian leadership in 1998.

Con este capítulo no pretendo un ensayo de historia económica venezolana, sino una interpretación de la misma que permita entender cómo extraviamos la senda exitosa de crecimiento económico e institucional a finales de los años 70 comenzando un ciclo de desgracias económicas: inflación, devaluación y estancamiento que, dieron fin a una sociedad exitosa hasta sumirla en el caos.

We study the role of the Military in the democratization of the political system using the theoretical tool of Game Theory. Although the elite, creator of the Army, intends to use it as the perfect agent for their interests and preservation of power, the latter ultimately responds to their own interests, maximizing their benefit function, which can be carried out in against / favoring the elite or the people, and always in favor of their own interests. By including a function of endogenous inequality we observe that the behavior of the army can be aligned with the non-qualified workers that try to consolidate a democracy.

The output gap is a relevant indicator for central banks committed to price stability and the fulfillment of inflation targets, since it allows determining inflationary pressures in the economy caused by an expansion of demand. In the present work the inflationary output gap has been estimated through Kalman’s multivariate filter for the Venezuelan case. The new curve of Phillips was the theoretical model upon which we based our analysis, since it incorporates the relation between the output gap and inflation. Our results suggest that there is a high correlation between the output gap obtained with the Kalman filter and that obtained with a production function approach, which make predictions and analysis based on this filter more reliable than those based on univariate filters.

Working papers

This paper examines the divergent economic trajectories of Colombia and Venezuela during the first half of the twentieth century through the lens of informal empire and institutional development. While much of the institutionalist literature emphasizes endogenous state capacity and secure property rights as prerequisites for growth, this study highlights the role of external geopolitical influence in shaping domestic institutions. Focusing on the 1920s and the interwar period, we argue that Venezuela’s integration into the U.S.-led international economy—via direct oil investment—contrasted sharply with Colombia’s debt-based engagement. These differing modes of integration influenced each country’s response to major external shocks such as the Great Depression and World War II, leading Venezuela to persist with an export-led model while Colombia shifted toward import-substitution industrialization during the 1930s. We provide empirical evidence of Venezuela’s exceptional growth and explore how political settlements, elite alignments, and early twentieth-century military conflicts shaped state capacity and institutional outcomes. A calibrated model further illustrates how resource endowments and external leverage produced distinct strategies of fiscal governance, with Venezuela maintaining stability through oil rents and Colombia relying on riskier debt-financed development.

This study investigates the effects of mercantilism on various aspects of governance, including political institutions, freedom of expression, civil rights, the rule of law, the judiciary, and the media. We document widespread detrimental effects of mercantilist policies. These effects are large in magnitude, statistically significant, and robust to various econometric specifications including panel data models and instrumental variables, even after controlling for factors such as education, inequality, openness, and economic freedom. Meanwhile, we find that the rule of law mitigates mercantilism and virtually nullifies its associated harms. Policy implications involve promoting the rule of law and economic freedom.

Macroeconomic modeling of Venezuela under a potential Recovery.

Development of a fiscal rule for Venezuela in the context of economic recovery and energy transition 2024